BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL REPORT ON
NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
AND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This summary provides a brief review of the report of the
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel resulting from its examination of
National Command and Control capability and the Defense Intel-
ligence Community.

With regard to National Command and Control capability,
we find that:

- The vulnerability of the present National Military
Command System (NMCS) to nuclear attack is a dangerously weak
element in the U.S. strategic deterrence posture.

- The capability of the National Military Command
System is being reduced, apparently for budgetary reasons.
There is no discernible activity to satisfy the recognized
requirement for a viable, survivable command system.

- Provisions for the continuity of political authority
and for the assurance of authorized retaliatory decisions in the
event of nuclear attack are inadequate.

- The National Military Command System cannot provide
the information that is assumed to be required by the National
Command Authorities in time for a rapid decision regarding
retaliation.

- The vulnerability of Ballistic Missiles to weapon
effects during attack will apparently require that launches
be staggered and spread over time. This will complicate the
command and control problem and could change the effectiveness
of the retaliatory forces. It is not clear that the implications
of this have been sufficiently explored.

DIA, JCS, OSD reviews completed

1

- The forthcoming deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) defenses will create a major problem in effecting coordina-
tion between ABM firings and strategic missile launches. The
strategy and tactics of a nuclear exchange which involves ABMs
have not been adequately developed. Closer coordination is
required than can reasonably be expected between two separate
commands.

We do not see any quick, simple or inexpensive solutions
to any of these problems. We do, however, recommend that:

1. The capability of the present National Military
Command System should not be further reduced until a better
understanding is achieved of the effects of such reductions on
the U.S. deterrent posture and the capability to launch retaliatory
forces as well as the credibility of such capability. The Secre-
tary of Defense should direct, as a matter of urgency, a compre-
hensive and objective analysis of the requirements for the
National Military Command System in the next decade. The
analysis should address the continuity of political authority,
as well as the facilities, equipment and concept of operations
needed to provide maximum support to the National Command
Authorities and to provide the greatest possible assurance
of positive command and control of U.S. and allied forces for
general war, as well as limited war, crisis situations and day-
to-day operations. An objective of the analysis should be to
achieve the best immediate posture with available equipment and
procedures and to provide guidance for research and development
toward a more capable system. In this latter regard, the analysis
should include a consideration of operational concepts which might
arise after SALT agreements, or in the absence of SALT agreements,
and should take fully into account the advancing technology of
warning systems and of weapons delivery systems.

2. A Strategic Command be created, composed of the
existing Strategic Air Command, the Joint Strategic Target
Planning Staff, the Continental Air Defense Command and Fleet
Ballistic Missile Operations.

With regard to intelligence, we find that:

The intelligence effort of the Department of Defense
is a part of a coordinated national effort, and represents
roughly 85 percent of the national intelligence resources. How-
ever, responsibility for the management of Defense intelligence
is fragmented between many elements of the Department and is
neither well coordinated nor adequately directed toward satisfying
proven consumer needs.

- There does not appear to be an effective mechanism for potential users of intelligence, either at National level or internal to the Department of Defense, to express their needs. The Defense intelligence community appears to function largely in response to requirements generated within the intelligence community.

- There is no effective mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources between the various intelligence functions. The present production resources can make use of only a fraction of the information that is collected.

- There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources to assure that needed information is collected in the most economical manner, consistent with the urgency of the need.

- There is no substantial effort or procedure to evaluate the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. It is not possible, today, to obtain an objective assessment of the validity of the requirements which drive the process, the efficiency and effectiveness of the collection and production functions nor the value and utility of the substantive output.

- Personnel security investigations are performed by the investigative elements of the Military Departments. The regulations of each of the Military Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that particular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments interpret this narrowly and usually do not accept the investigations of another Department as meeting their standards.

- Each Military Department has a large organization devoted primarily to Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) activities. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Departmental staffs, and only the Air Force MC&G agency is within the purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G agencies are not a part of the intelligence community.

- There is no substantial corps of professional intelligence officers in the Military Services, nor a professional intelligence career service for civilians in the general Defense intelligence community. The National Security Agency secured special legislation which permits the employment of career analysts with compensation equivalent to Grade 16, 17, and 18 levels. The Director also has the authority to assign and reassign civilian personnel to the position and geographic location where their talents can be best used.

- There are at present three major special systems and many independent programs operating in the Department of Defense to protect very sensitive intelligence information. Each of the major systems is managed by a different organization which jealously controls access to its information. This independent control makes it very difficult to assure that balanced judgment is applied between the need for exploitation and the need for protection, especially where sensitive information is covered under two or more of the special access areas.

The Panel recommends that the Defense intelligence community be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the President, other consumers at the national level and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defense to operating units in the field. The new intelligence structure should:

1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities.

2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flow of intelligence information and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location.

3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who is the clearly designated representative of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence activities within the Department.

4. Provide flexibility for timely development and distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained personnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities.

5. Provide the proper environment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service for both military and civilian personnel.

Specifically, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

1. Designate the Deputy Secretary for Operations to be his agent for all matters relating to intelligence, to include the authority to designate those activities to be considered intelligence activities.

2. Establish under the Deputy Secretary for Operations an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)), with the additional title of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). The ASD(I)/DDI would be delegated the responsibility to represent the Secretary of Defense with other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and to coordinate or direct all DOD intelligence activities, including national programs which are managed in the Department, in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Among his specific responsibilities, the ASD(I)/DDI would:

a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelligence Board, and appoint, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, representatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards.

b. Direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces.

c. Have the authority to delegate operation of any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximum exploitation of DOD resources.

d. Review all proposed intelligence programs, monitor and evaluate all on-going intelligence activities and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with regard to allocation of resources.

e. Establish procedures to review and validate requirements for intelligence production and collection and evaluate the product against the requirement.

f. Establish procedures for and periodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. This evaluation should include an assessment of the utility of the intelligence products provided to consumers outside the Defense intelligence community.

g. Review and consolidate requirements for research and development in support of intelligence activities.

h. Develop policies and procedures to insure the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This will include the establishment and control of special access systems for sensitive programs not already covered by systems initiated by higher authority. He will insure that balanced judgment is applied between the need for exploitation and the need for protection, particularly recognizing that the balance of this relationship shifts through the phases of intelligence operations: identifying requirements and concept formulation; development, procurement and implementation; collection; processing; production; and dissemination.

3. Establish under the ASD(I)/DDI:

a. A Defense Security Command (DSECC) to be composed of the present Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except for those which have been specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. The DSECC should perform those processing activities which are most efficiently associated with collection facilities. Among his specific responsibilities, the Commander, DSECC would, under the direction of the DDI:

(1) Command all those designated Defense intelligence collection and associated processing and reporting activities, with authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Serve as Director, National Security Agency.

(3) Insure the most judicious use of common staff elements between his DSECC and NSA.

(4) Insure the timely dissemination of intelligence information to all appropriate Departments, Agencies, Commands or operating units.

(5) Prepare the Defense Security Program for those activities for which he is responsible, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence collection activities organic to the combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

b. A Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), to replace the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Director would be responsible for Defense Intelligence production except for those production activities specifically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary for Operations. Among his specific responsibilities, the Director, DIPA would:

(1) Direct those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Provide current intelligence to designated individuals and organizations.

(3) Provide threat assessments for all elements of DOD, as required.

(4) Provide finished intelligence to appropriate elements of the Department in response to expressed needs.

(5) Provide all DOD intelligence estimates and inputs to national estimates as directed by the DDI.

(6) Manage all Defense intelligence production information systems, including those of the intelligence activities organic to the combatant forces, to insure inter-operability and optimized intelligence flow to and from all echelons of DOD.

(7) Prepare the Defense Intelligence Program for those activities under his direction, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence production activities organic to combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

4. Expand the responsibilities of the National Security Agency to include the processing, data base maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information as directed by the DDI.

5. Establish within the DSECC a unified Defense Investigative Service responsible for all personnel security investigations within the DOD and its contractors.

6. Combine the Army Topographic Command, the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Aeronatuical Chart and Information Center into a unified Defense Map Service reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Management of Resources).

7. Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entire Defense intelligence community the authority that the National Security Agency presently has to develop a professional career service, and (b) to establish an intelligence career service for military officers.

Annex A - BRDP Identified Deficiencies

The Blue Ribbon Panel has identified certain deficiencies in the intelligence community and summarized these in the Executive Summary of the Report. These are:

1. There does not appear to be an effective mechanism for potential users of intelligence to express their needs.

2. There is no effective mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources.

3. There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources.

4. There is no substantial effort or procedure to evaluate the intelligence process.

5. There is no effective control of the various military department security investigation procedures.

6. There is no effective coordination of the mapping, charting and geodesy activities of the military departments.

7. There is no substantial corps of professional intelligence officers in the military Services nor is there a professional intelligence career service for civilians.

8. There is no balanced judgment applied in the national programs between the need for exploitation and the need for security protection.

TOP SECRET

Within the Intelligence Annex to the Report there is even more damaging language used to describe deficiencies found than the generalizations in the paragraph above. Specifically, the Annex indicates that:

1. There is little or no coordination among Defense representatives and observers on the USIB and they often appear to be working at cross purposes.

2. The value of the intelligence estimating process is often destroyed in the coordination/revision cycle as watered down compromises are accepted.

3. Support money for approved intelligence programs, once allotted to the Services, may or may not be used for the purpose allotted.

4. It is not possible to make valid judgments on the allocation of collection resources without considering the requirement for the information and balancing this against the degree to which the information collected fits this requirement.

5. The Services, to protect their individual capabilities, attempt to incorporate electronic intelligence specialists in programs outside the jurisdiction of the Director NSA.

6. The Defense Intelligence Agency has too many jobs and too many masters.

7. The Defense Intelligence Agency supervision of intelligence collection and processing by the Services is largely impotent.

TOP SECRET

8.   DIA is unable to develop a capability to perform its assigned functions, yet the military departments maintain the required capability and do perform the functions.

9.   The requirements process is slow, cumbersome and unwieldy.

10.   There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources which is economical and consistent with the urgency of the need.

11.   DIA has no directive authority over military intelligence activities.

12.   It is alleged that more intelligence is collected than can be processed or used, HUMINT adds nothing to the national capability, production analysts are incompetent, and the finished intelligence product seldom reaches those who need it.

13.   The national program managers utilize their "national designation" to avoid reporting to ASD(A); and the staffs are either ignorant of their responsibilities or deliberately misleading in their statements to the BRDP.

14.   Technical intelligence resources are neither identified nor reviewed.

15.   The major compartmented systems jealously guard prerogatives and there is no evidence that these have ever been reviewed

A-3

Annex B - Alternative #1

The objective of this alternative is to describe an organization which adheres to the BRDP recommendations to the greatest extent possible. To do so, the proposed organization would establish an ASD(I) whose office would become the DoD center for intelligence with both line and staff responsibilities. He would be the Director of Defense Intelligence. These responsibilities would create a requirement for a sizeable staff with line and staff functions. However, these positions could be drawn from within the DoD intelligence community as a result of restructuring actions. (This would probably be met with something less than enthusiasm).

Under this alternative it is assumed that all Defense intelligence activities are subordinate to an ASD(I) including national programs currently managed elsewhere within the Department of Defense. However, there would be no immediate transfer of responsibility for the management of organic theater intelligence resources to the ASD(I). Decisions regarding these would not be undertaken pending establishment of the ASD(I) in order that these decisions could be made with his approval.

Two major organizations are directly subordinate to the ASD(I). The first is the Defense Security Command (DSECC), charged with the responsibility for all defense intelligence collection activity. The second is the Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), responsible for all defense intelligence production activity. Collection, processing

and production currently being performed by DIA, NSA, the national

programs and the Services would be delineated by ASD(I) and subordinated

to these two major activities. The Director, NSA would be double hatted,

also serving as the Commander, Defense Security Command. The Service

cryptologic agencies would report to the Commander DSECC. The Director,

DIA would become Director Defense Intelligence Production Agency. Both

the Commander, DSECC, and Director, DIPA would have command and/or

operational control of all subordinate organizations.

The ASD(I) would represent DoD on USIB and NIRB. He would

appoint representatives to the USIB committees from any subordinate DoD

intelligence organization on a "best qualified" basis. These representatives

would be DoD representatives - not agency or Service representatives.

A single change has been made to BRDP recommendations in this

alternative. This involves the recommended establishment of a Defense

Investigative Service (DIS) as a subordinate element of the Defense Security

Command. Analysis of this proposal leads to the conclusion that (1) it is

desirable for the ASD(I) to have policy responsibility for all aspects of security

and counterintelligence and (2) this activity is not within the general functional

area of collection. The creation of such a DIS may not be practicable, and

its subordination (if created) to the command charged with collection (DSECC)

B-2

CONFIDENTIAL

does not appear to be logical.　　— 　Therefore, Alternative #1 would

simply combine the responsibility for policies in the fields of Security

Classification, Investigation and Counterintelligence at the ASD(I) level

with operations retained in the Services.　The establishment of a Defense

Investigative Service would be the subject of further analysis.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALTERNATIVE NR 1

```
                        ┌─────────────┐
                        │   ASD(I)    │
                        │   OASD(I)   │
                        └─────────────┘
         ┌────────────────────┼─────────────────────────┐
  ┌──────────────┐     ┌──────────────┐          ┌──────────────┐
  │    DSECC     │     │    DIPA      │          │    DIS       │
  └──────────────┘     └──────────────┘          └──────────────┘
        │                     │
  ┌──────────┐         ┌──────────┐   ┌──────────┐
  │   NSA    │         │  S&T     │   │ CURRENT  │
  └──────────┘         │  INTEL   │   │  INTEL   │
        │              └──────────┘   └──────────┘
  ┌──────────┐
  │  SCA'S   │         ┌──────────┐   ┌──────────┐
  └──────────┘         │ESTIMATES │   │ THREAT   │
        │              └──────────┘   │ ASSESS-  │
  ┌──────────┐                        │  MENT    │
  │  HUMINT  │                        └──────────┘
  └──────────┘
        │
  ┌──────────┐
  │   NATL   │
  │ PROGRAMS │
  └──────────┘
        │
  ┌──────────┐
  │ SVC TECH │
  │ SENSORS  │
  └──────────┘
```

.. The following are the considerations on Alternative #1:

On the One Hand:

1. Most closely adheres to BRDP recommendations; therefore may be "politically" desirable.

2. Provides a clear and tight management authority through centralization at ASD(I) level with a minimum number of subordinate elements reporting to the ASD(I).

3. Provides DoD intelligence with first-rank representation on the OSD staff since the ASD(I) reports directly to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary.

4. Permits resource allocation through centralized planning, programming and budgeting management which is integrated with requirements analysis and management.

5. Coordinates DoD position on the USIB.

6. Eliminates undesirable duplication in collection and production activities.

7. Provides coordinated threat assessment, estimating and current intelligence production from a single management source.

8. Centralizes security classification, investigation, and counter-intelligence policy making and eliminates current excessive compartmentation and duplication.

9. Coordinates technical sensor collection programs under a single manager and also strengthens central management of technical production activities.

10. Provides a staff capable of developing techniques to assess the usefulness of the intelligence product to the user.

On the Other Hand:

1. Requires additional personnel at ASD(I) level, as well as at OJCS J-2 level (the latter as a result of disestablishment of DIA and placement of its successor under the ASD(I), not the JCS).

2. Eliminates the Services from traditional role in estimating.

3. Removes Service representation per se on USIB committees.

4. Removes from the Services the management of technical sensor and technical production activities required in support of the Services' missions.

5. Removes control of Service cryptologic agencies from parent service. (However, at the present time NSCID 6 permits NSA to exercise OPCON over these agencies).

6. Would create a serious imbalance with the majority of resources ($ and people) in the DSECC.

/

B-5

7. Subordinates the management of National Programs to an additional level of management and operational control. (Additionally, lowers the resource allocation decision making level within DoD from the Deputy SecDef to the ASD(I)).

B 6

CONFIDENTIAL

Annex C - Alternative #2

The objective of this alternative is to describe an organization

which is consistent with the majority of BRDP Intelligence Annex recommen-

dations yet varies in certain areas. Specifically, the national programs

would not be subordinate to the DSECC, but would report directly to ASD(I),

and as in Alternative #1, there would not initially be a Defense Investigative

Service.

Under this concept, the ASD(I) would have full operational control

of DSECC, DIPA and the national programs. The ASD(I) would have both

line and staff responsibilities. The organization would differ from that in

Alternative #1 in two ways:

        (1) The Director, NSA would not also be the Commander DSECC.

        (2) The Commander DSECC would not control the national

programs.

The ASD(I), as in Alternative #1, would represent DoD on USIB and NIRB,

appointing representatives to USIB committees from subordinate DoD

intelligence activities on a "best qualified" basis.

Decisions regarding any changes in responsibility for the management

of organic theater intelligence resources would be made by SecDef upon

recommendations of ASD(I) and the JCS.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALTERNATIVE NR 2

```
                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │   ASD(I)     │
                          │   OASD(I)    │
                          └──────────────┘
                                 │
      ┌──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────┬ - - - - ┐
┌───────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐  ┌ ─ ─ ─ ┐
│     DSECC      │      │    DIPA      │      │  NATIONAL    │    DIS
│               │      │              │      │  PROGRAMS    │  └ ─ ─ ─ ┘
└───────────────┘      └──────────────┘      └──────────────┘
        │                     │
┌─────────────┐      ┌───────────┐  ┌───────────┐
│    NSA      │      │   S&T     │  │  CURRENT  │
└─────────────┘      │  INTEL    │  │  INTEL    │
┌─────────────┐      └───────────┘  └───────────┘
│   SCA'S     │
└─────────────┘      ┌───────────┐  ┌───────────┐
┌─────────────┐      │ESTIMATES  │  │  THREAT   │
│  HUMINT     │      └───────────┘  │ ASSESS-   │
└─────────────┘                     │  MENT     │
┌─────────────┐                     └───────────┘
│ SVC TECH    │
│ SENSORS     │
└─────────────┘
```

The following are considerations on Alternative #2.

On the One Hand:

1. As in alternative #1, this alternative:

a. Provides a relatively tight management authority and a manageable number of organizational elements subordinate to ASD(I).

b. Provides ---in the ASD(I) ---first rank representation on the OSD staff.

c. Coordinates DoD position on USIB.

d. Centralizes policies for security and counterintelligence:

e. Provides an OASD(I) staff to develop techniques to assess the usefulness of the intelligence product to the user.

f. Eliminates undesirable duplication in collection and production activities.

g. Provides for coordinated threat assessment, estimating and current intelligence production from a single management source.

h. Coordinates technical sensor collection programs under a single manager and also strengthens central management of technical production activities

2. Does not create as large an imbalance in resources between DSECC and DIPA as does Alternative #1.

3. Provides for management of national programs from the OSD level as opposed to a lower level evident in Alternative #1.

On the Other Hand:

1. Eliminates the Services from traditional role in the estimating process.

2. Removes Service representation on USIB committees.

3. Removes cryptologic agencies, technical sensor and technical production activities from control of the Services.

4. Could require additional personnel at ASD(I) and OJCS (J-2) levels.

5. Continues fractionization and diluted management of certain collection resources since the directors of specific collection programs would be able to bypass the DSECC.

C-3

Alternative #3 describes an organization which is structured to achieve some - but not all - of the BRDP recommendations with a minimum of upheaval in the immediate time frame.

Conceptually, an ASD(I) would be established whose office would become a focal point for DoD intelligence. The ASD(I) direction and control responsibilities would be those recommended in the BRDP Report and outlined in Alternatives #1 and #2.

Under this alternative the major deviation from the BRDP Report is found at lower echelons. The DSECC and DIPA would not be created. A review of the NSCID's and DoD Directives indicates that the significant problems highlighted by the BRDP have not resulted primarily from organizational deficiencies.' The situation has been compounded by the lack of an OSD level manager other than the Secretary/Deputy Secretary. Therefore, under this alternative, NSA and DIA continue to function as they do now except for the following changes:

1. ASD(I) is the principal DoD representative to the USIB and he would appoint - as in the other alternatives - the DoD committee representatives.

2. NSA's responsibilities in the SIGINT environment will be explicitly defined by the Secretary. This would require a review of existing national and DoD Directives with subsequent recommendations.

3. DIA would not report through the JCS to the Secretary but through the ASD(I). The JCS would then require internal intelligence-staff support.

4. The DIA charter would be revised to strengthen DIA's management role which has been acknowledged tacitly and ignored practically.

As in Alternatives #1 and #2, policy responsibilities for security classification and procedures (to include special access systems), investigations and counterintelligence activities would be centered in the OASD(I) with consideration given to the establishment of the DIS as an agency reporting to the Secretary, through the ASD(I).

The intelligence collection and production functions currently being performed by the Services will be examined, and as applicable, subordinated to the Director, DIA.

ALTERNATIVE NR 3

```
                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │   ASD(I)    │
                    │  OASD(I)    │
                    └─────────────┘
                           │
     ┌─────────────────────┼──────────────────────┬ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┐
┌──────────────┐    ┌─────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐  ┌ ─ ─ ─ ┐
│     NSA      │    │     DIA     │    │   NATIONAL   │  │  DIS  │
│              │    │             │    │   PROGRAMS   │  └ ─ ─ ─ ┘
└──────────────┘    └─────────────┘    └──────────────┘
       ┆                   │
┌──────────────┐    ┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│  SCA'S 1/    ┆    │    S&T      │─│   CURRENT    │
└──────────────┘    │   INTEL     │ │    INTEL     │
                    └─────────────┘ └──────────────┘
                    ┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
                    │  ESTIMATES  │─│   THREAT     │
                    │             │ │  ASSESS-     │
                    └─────────────┘ │   MENT       │
                                    └──────────────┘
                    ┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
                    │  SVC TECH   │ │   HUMINT     │
                    │  SENSORS    │─│              │
                    └─────────────┘ └──────────────┘
```

1/ SCA's OPCON to NSA

The following are the considerations on Alternative #3.

On the One Hand:

1. Provides rapid implementation of selected recommendations in the shortest period of time, with a minimum of organizational upheaval.

2. Provides an OSD level focal point for intelligence in the position of the ASD(I).

3. Coordinates DoD position on the USIB.

4. Reduces unnecessary duplication in collection and production.

5. Provides coordinated threat assessment, estimating and current intelligence production from a single management source.

6. Coordinates security classification, investigation and counter-intelligence policy making with a goal of eliminating the current excessive compartmentation and duplication.

7. Strengthens centralized management of technical production activities within DIA.

8. Provides a staff capable of developing techniques to assess the usefulness of the intelligence product to the consumer.

On the Other Hand:

1. Deviates significantly from the BRDP recommendations.

2. Requires additional personnel at the OSD level, as well as in the Joint Staff. Corresponding reductions would come from within the DoD intelligence community.

/

Annex E - Alternative #4

Alternative #4 describes an organization which is structured substantially the same as that proposed by the BRDP. However, it is presented as an alternative which would achieve the Panel principal goals through a more centralized approach than proposed by the BRDP.

Under this concept the ASD(I) would be established. The ASD(I) would be the principal intelligence, counterintelligence and security staff officer. He would direct all DoD intelligence activities not specifically declared by the Secretary to be organic to combatant forces. His staff would, of necessity, be large. He would be the DoD representative on USIB and would appoint representatives to USIB committees from subordinate agencies.

Immediately subordinate would be three intelligence activities:

(1) The Defense Intelligence Operations Agency (DIOA).

(2) The Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA).

(3) The Defense Intelligence Support Agency (DISA).

The Defense Intelligence Operations Agency would supervise all intelligence collection, reconnaissance and surveillance operations. The Director would also be the Director, NSA. The Service cryptologic agencies and technical sensor activities would be under the operational control of the Director DIOA. The directors of the national programs

would also be under the operational control of the Director DIOA.

All intelligence production activities would be subordinate to the Director, Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), who would exercise operational control. The DIPA would provide current intelligence and production, support to SecDef, OSD, defense agencies, JCS, and the Service ACSI's. The Director DIPA would act as the alternate DoD representative on USIB. As directed by ASD(I) he would coordinate collection priorities to satisfy intelligence consumer requirements.

The third agency which would be created under this concept would be the Defense Intelligence Support Agency. The purposes of this agency would be to provide common support services to the Defense intelligence community, to be the focal point for all intelligence R&D, and to provide a headquarters for counterintelligence and security operations. Finally, the DISA could provide common technical services in the field of ELINT analysis, image interpretation, translation, and ADP. Among the common services for which the DISA could be made responsible are the following: personnel services, intelligence career development programs, pay and finances, training/schools, computer services, purchasing and contracting, external contract services, administrative services, communications support, supply and logistics support, graphic arts support, printing support, security

guard support, security clearances support, libraries and publications,

special security support, and transportation services.

ALTERNATIVE NR 4

```
                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │   ASD(I)     │
                          │   OASD(I)    │
                          └──────┬───────┘
          ┌──────────────────────┼──────────────────────┐
   ┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────┐
   │    DIOA      │      │    DISA      │        │    DIPA      │
   └──────────────┘      └──────────────┘        └──────────────┘
```

DIOA	DISA		DIPA
NSA	R&D	SECURITY SERVICES	S&T INTEL
SCA'S	ADMIN SERVICES	CAREER DEVELOPM	ESTI-MATES
HUMINT	PERSON-NEL	ADP	CURRENT INTEL
NATL PROGRAMS	LANGUAGE SVCS	TRAINING	THREAT ASSESSM
SVC TECH SENSORS			

The following are considerations on Alternative #4.

On the One Hand:

1. Provides a clear and tight management authority with a minimum number of subordinate elements.

2. Eliminates duplication of common support services.

3. Provides an organization for development of intelligence career planning.

4. Provides central management of resources as well as centralized materiel procurement.

5. Provides a coordinated DoD position on USIB matters.

6. Provides an analysis staff in OASD(I) to evaluate the value of intelligence product to DoD consumers.

7. Reduces the resources imbalance between "collection" and "production" agencies by placing many common usage support items under supervision of an independent agency.

On the Other Hand:

1. The establishment of DISA would be costly and difficult to implement because of the physical separation of existing activities which support intelligence organizations.

2. The individual agencies will resist being placed in a position of depending upon a support agency for services which they consider essential to their mission.

3. As with other alternatives, the Military Services could be eliminated from their traditional role in USIB matters and in cryptologic, tech sensor and tech production activities.

4. Subordinates national programs to the lower additional level of management as in alternative #1.

Annex F - Concept Paper - ASD(I)

SUBJECT: ASD (Intelligence)

-Under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, one
of the authorized positions of Assistant Secretary of Defense is
designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).
Responsibilities, functions and authorities are prescribed herein.

-The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) is the
Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
He is also designated the Director, Defense Intelligence to control and
direct all intelligence activities within the Department of Defense.

-The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director
of Defense Intelligence shall perform the following functions:

A. Develop policies and prepare plans for managing and
organizing all intelligence activities within DoD not specifically
designated by the Secretary of Defense as organic to combatant forces.

B. Act as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense
for the conduct of all DoD intelligence activities.

C. Establish and direct procedures to review and validate
DoD requirements for collection, processing, production and dissemination
of intelligence.

D. Conduct the review of all DoD Intelligence Programs and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the allocation of resources.

E. Establish policies for the conduct of all DoD activities in the following areas of the Security of Classified Information:

    (1) Management of the DoD Security Classification Program;

    (2) Management of the DoD Security Investigation Program; and

    (3) Management of the DoD Counterintelligence Program.

F. Coordinate the requirements for research and development for DoD intelligence and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for allocation of these resources.

G. Establish policies to develop a professional DoD civil career intelligence service; coordinate the development of corresponding career intelligence specialties within the military departments.

H. Develop long range, intermediate range and short range DoD intelligence objectives plans.

I. Establish procedures for the assessment of the DoD intelligence cycle including analysis of the value of the intelligence provided

to external recipients of DoD Intelligence.

J. Act as principal representative of the Secretary of Defense on the USIB. Appoint representatives, as required, on the various USIB committees from qualified personnel assigned to the various DoD Intelligence organizations.

K. Represent the Secretary of Defense in all matters involving intelligence which concern other departments and agencies of the National Government. Appoint representatives, as required to all inter-government intelligence boards, committees, or liaison groups.

L. Act as the Department of Defense Representative on the National Intelligence Resources Board.

M. Coordinate DoD position on National Intelligence Estimates and approve Defense Intelligence Estimates as prepared by the Director, DIA.

N. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the CMO and Secretaries of the military departments those intelligence collection and production activities which should be designated as organic to combatant forces.

25X1

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

I. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The National "intelligence community" consists of the
Departments and Agencies of the Government which are responsible
for the collection of information and production of foreign
intelligence essential to the security of the United States.
The principal departments and agencies of the intelligence
community are the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State,
the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). It is essential that the activities of
the departments and agencies be closely coordinated to assure
efficient and effective operation.

The DCI is responsible for the general management and
coordination of the intelligence community, in addition to
serving as the Director of CIA.

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is the formal
instrument established by the National Security Council (NSC)
to advise and assist the DCI, as he requires, in discharging
his statutory responsibilities. The responsibilities and func-
tions of the USIB are set forth in National Security Council
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1. Its primary responsibility
is to achieve an effectively coordinated intelligence community
in the interest of National Security.

The major functions assigned in NSCID No. 1 are:

1. To establish policies and develop programs for
the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned.

2. To establish appropriate intelligence objectives,
requirements and priorities.

3. To review the national intelligence effort and
report to the NSC on its adequacy, integration and gaps identified.

4. To make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters to appropriate government officials, including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director, NSA.

5. To develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

6. To formulate, as required, policies in regard to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

The functions of USIB are performed through its 14 committees and sub-committees. Most of the Chairmen of the USIB committees and sub-committees are representatives of the DCI, provided from the National Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff, which supports him.

The Department of Defense is represented on the USIB by the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). When DIA was established, its Director replaced the senior intelligence officers of the three military departments on the USIB; however, they are permitted to participate in board meetings as observers and to add footnotes to USIB papers stating their points of disagreement. The military departments still retain full membership on the committees and sub-committees of the USIB. There is little or no coordination among the Defense representatives and observers on the USIB and they often appear to be working at cross purposes.

Intelligence requirements at the national level are determined in the USIB entirely by representatives of the intelligence community. It is not clear that consumers of intelligence outside the intelligence community make a significant contribution to this process.

The Board of National Estimates (BNE) is composed of a number of distinguished men, appointed by the DCI, from industry, the academic community and the professions. The BNE periodically submits to USIB a program of proposed production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for approval. Upon approval, terms of reference for each estimate are prepared and contributions are obtained from the member agencies of the USIB. The BNE completes its evaluation and submits a first draft for coordination with the member agencies. After revision, the estimate is submitted

to the USIB for approval. If any member of the USIB or any of the senior intelligence officers of the Services disagree with the estimate, the dissenting opinions are published as integral parts of the estimate. The value of the estimate process is often destroyed in the coordination - revision cycle as watered-down compromises are accepted rather than establishing the basic document, and then adding the disagreements.

The National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) was recently established to advise the DCI on needs for intelligence resources to support the U.S. foreign intelligence effort. The members of the NIRB are the Deputy, DCI, Chairman; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.

II. THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Defense Intelligence effort is normally programmed in two major packages: The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), with the Director, NSA designated Program Manager; and The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), with the Director, DIA designated Program Manager. While the Director, NSA and Director, DIA are designated Program Managers they do not in fact manage the Defense intelligence effort. The responsibility for management of the effort is fragmented within and between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Military Departments. The Program Managers consolidate the submissions of all participants in the program, but do not have control of the budget. Once money to support the approved program is allocated to the Services, they may or may not use it for its intended purposes.

From time to time special programs are established to develop some new intelligence resource or capability. In such cases a program manager is designated by the Secretary of Defense and the program becomes a part of the intelligence community.

A. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

Currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (ASD(A)) is clearly the senior official in the Defense organ-ization for managing the intelligence effort. On August 1, 1969, the Secretary of Defense assigned "additional responsibilities for intelligence" to the ASD(A) and stated:

23

"In discharging these responsibilities, I fully expect the ASD(A) to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense intelligence community. In order to accomplish this improvement, he is charged with the following responsibilities:

    1. To establish an intelligence resource review and decision-making process which will comprise:

    a. A mechanism for making comparisons and appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activities and programs so that DOD decision makers can select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing, producing and disseminating intelligence.

    b. A Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan.

    c. A procedure for identifying and surfacing major issues of intelligence resource allocation and management.

    d. A continuing system for review of intelligence collection requirements balanced against collection resources.

    2. To improve intelligence communications among DOD agencies and between the Department of Defense and other agencies.

    3. To evaluate intelligence organizational relationships, roles and missions.

    4. To review security policies and eliminate unnecessary classification and compartmentations."

The ASD(A) has limited his purview, initially, to resource allocation and has established a review process wherein each Program Manager is responsible for resource management within his program. Procedures are worked out whereby each Program Manager conducts his review and then reports to the ASD(A). The ASD(A) then performs a review across all the programs to identify areas where there is a possibility of duplication or inefficiency.

The ASD(A) has adopted the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) as a management tool to assist in his cross-program review.

The CIRIS is a modification of an older system called the Target Oriented Display. It is intended to display, by type, the number and value of resources aimed at collecting intelligence information about a given target. The targets are classified by geopolitical area and military activity; e.g., Soviet strategic missile systems, Warsaw Pact ground forces or Chinese nuclear capability.

The CIRIS contains only information on intelligence resources and how they are related to targets. It does not include information about the nature of the requirement to collect intelligence information about a target nor does it provide an assessment of the value of the information that is collected.

It is not possible to make valid judgments on the proper allocation of a collection resource to a target without considering why, and with what urgency, the information is required and balancing that against the degree to which the information collected by the resource satisfies the requirement.

There is a real need to make comparisons and trade-offs between the major intelligence activities and programs to select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing, producing and disseminating intelligence. Resources should be allocated to attain a balance in the capability to collect, process and produce intelligence. It appears at present that collection capabilities far exceed the capabilities to process and produce.

B. The Cryptologic Community

The organizations involved in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) effort are referred to collectively as the Cryptologic Community. This community consists of the National Security Agency (NSA), at its head, and the service cryptologic agencies (SCAs). Also holding membership in this community, though not generally included in the term, is the SIGINT Committee, with its sub-committees, of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

The current authority for organization and operation of this community is the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6, effective 15 September 1958, and revised 18 January 1961. This document provides the national policy for Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), collectively referred to as SIGINT. It defines the responsibilities of the USIB, Secretary of Defense, NSA, Director NSA, DCI and Military Departments.

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

C. General Defense Intelligence

General defense intelligence encompasses the intelligence activities, other than cryptologic, performed by elements of the Department of Defense, primarily the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Military Services. The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) is the management tool used to program and manage the general defense intelligence effort. The Director, DIA is designated Program Manager and consolidates the submissions of the Military Departments.

There is no substantial corps of professional intelligence officers in the Military Services and no professional intelligence career service for civilians in the general defense intelligence community. There are no incentives for a military officer to become an intelligence specialist, with the result that military billets in the intelligence community are filled by a succession of transient generalists. Civilians become intelligence specialists largely on the basis of longevity only. The present Defense intelligence community with its fragmented responsibilities does not provide an environment in which a professional career intelligence service can be developed.

DIA was established in 1961 in an effort to create a mechanism to solve the problems presented by the disparate intelligence estimates being produced and duplicative efforts being engaged in by the Military Departments.

DIA is assigned the responsibility for:

      1. The organization, direction, management, and control of all DOD intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA.

      2. Review and coordination of those intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the Military Departments.

      3. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA.

      4. Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Defense intelligence resources.

      5. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the DIA by the United States Intelligence Board.

      6. Satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.

Its charter reveals that DIA was originally intended to (1) provide for the assembly, integration and validation of all Defense intelligence requirements, the policies and procedures for collection, and the assignment of relative priorities to the requirements, and (2) develop and produce all finished intelligence for the Department of Defense. It was intended that the Military Departments would retain the resources to collect and process intelligence information, under the supervision of DIA.

Concurrent with the establishment of DIA, the Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) of the Joint Staff was disestablished and its functions assigned to the Director of DIA. The established reporting line for DIA was and is through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

The principal problems of DIA can be summarized as too many jobs and too many masters.

Two areas of conflict are apparent. In addition to his administrative responsibilities as the Director of a Defense Agency, the Director of DIA must provide the staff assistance on intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and must also provide the staff assistance on intelligence matters to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On many intelligence issues, particularly procedural issues with jurisdictional implications, the positions of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be and often are diverse. As staff officer and advisor to both, the Director of DIA finds himself in an impossible position. The result can be delays in staff work that in turn result in unresolved issues of significant moment.

The second area of conflict is between DIA and the Military Services. The Director, DIA is charged with preparing the GDIP and with responsibility to supervise the collection and processing of intelligence by the Military Services, specifically by prescribing procedures, validating requirements, assigning collection and production tasks, and reviewing the total intelligence programs of the Services. Yet, the Director of DIA reports directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprised in four-fifths majority by the Senior Officers of the four Military Services for whose intelligence programs the Director of DIA is charged with the responsibility to provide coordinated supervision. In addition, the Services determine which officers of what qualification are assigned to DIA, and they retain the power of promotion and future assignment over those so assigned. In consequence, the "supervision" by DIA of intelligence collection and processing by the Services and its fiscal control and coordination of the Service intelligence programs are largely impotent.

The Military Departments are charged with organizing, training and equipping intelligence forces for assignment to combatant commands, and to conduct those intelligence functions which peculiarly relate to departmental missions, including the development and support of intelligence systems organic to combatant forces. In addition, each department has retained the responsibility to manage and operate certain types of intelligence activities, including counter-intelligence and investigative services, scientific and technical intelligence, mapping, charting and geodesy as well as their respective cryptologic agencies.

While the DIA was established primarily to consolidate the intelligence activities at Washington level, each Military Department currently has a larger intelligence staff than it had before the creation of DIA. Each departmental staff is still engaged in

31

activities clearly assigned to DIA such as intelligence produc-
tion including the preparation of current intelligence. The
Military Departments justify these activities on the basis that
DIA does not have the capability to provide the intelligence they
need. It is interesting that DIA cannot develop a capability to
perform its assigned functions, while the Military Departments,
which provide a large proportion of DIA personnel, maintain the
required capability and continue to perform the functions. A
case in point is the capability to produce intelligence estimates,
(or more properly, threat assessments), which are crucial to
decisions on weapons systems research and development. DIA is
charged with the responsibility, but has never been structured
to discharge it. The Military Departments produce such estimates,
and the Air Force, at least, intends to enlarge its capability.

1. The Intelligence Process

        The intelligence process can generally be considered
as consisting of five functions: requirements, collection, proc-
essing, production and dissemination. There is now no effective
mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources
between these various functions. There is some evidence that much
more information is being collected than can be processed, and
unquestionably, more can be processed than can be used in pro-
duction.

a. Requirements

        In March 1962, shortly after the establishment of
DIA, the JCS issued to DIA a memorandum, entitled: "Actions to
Strengthen the Intelligence Capabilities of the Unified and
Specified Commands," and concomitantly, a memorandum to the
Commanders of each Unified and Specified Commands, entitled:
"Authority to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities of Commanders
of Unified and Specified Commands." These memoranda directed
that intelligence staffs and attendant intelligence activities
be established. Specifically, an Intelligence Requirements/
Collection Office was directed to be established at each Unified
and Specified Command Headquarters which would perform functions
compatible with the requirements and collection functions of DIA.
DIA was directed to issue guidance as to policies, procedures,
format and priorities of intelligence requirements to achieve
standardization of requirements processing throughout DOD. Require-
ments flow would follow command channels to DIA for validation and
for levy. This action was the basis for establishing layers of

review. In a message of March 1962, from the JCS to the
Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands, that body
clearly pointed out that the channel for requirements is between
DIA, acting for the JCS, and the Unified and Specified Commanders;
and in turn from the Unified and Specified Commanders to their
components. The original intent of these actions was to take
the staffs and activities from the component commands and move
them one echelon higher, but this did not happen, since the
Military Department Headquarters were still authorized direct
access to the component commands.

Throughout the 1960s, the various intelligence
elements of the Military Departments complained about the
inordinate time it takes for a requirement to be validated by
DIA. The complaints are well-founded. The various layers of
review consume time; the mere courier forwarding and administra-
tive handling within each organization adds to the delay. Addi-
tionally, DIA was given the responsibility to insure that require-
ments were not duplicative, that sufficient research was to be
done to establish that the information was not in existence within
the files of DIA, or other intelligence files within the intelli-
gence community, prior to levying a specific collection require-
ment. If the requirement had to be levied on a national agency,
up to six months might pass before DIA was notified of the accept-
ance of that requirement by that national agency. This time span
has now been reduced to an average of about one month.

Another problem has existed concerning the handling
of collection requirements for scientific and technical intelli-
gence. When DIA was given the responsibility for management of
scientific and technical intelligence, a specific Assistant
Directorship was established and the Directorate took as its
charter the DOD Directive 5105.28, which included the responsi-
bility for the assembly, integration, validation, and assignment
of priorities for all Defense technical intelligence collection
and production requirements. The result was a conflict between
the Assistant Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence
and the Assistant Director for Collection, from the chiefs down
through the action officers. This reinforced the accusation that
the requirements validation process was unreasonably slow, and
that it was difficult to know to whom to direct requirements,
questions, and/or correspondence concerning those requirements.

The requirements process is slow, cumbersome and
unwieldy. It functions almost entirely within the intelligence
community and is fraught with an unyielding sense of sovereignty

at every level. There does not appear to be an effective
mechanism for potential users of intelligence to express their
needs. The intelligence community must accept its responsibility
to function in response to valid consumer requirements and develop
procedures to permit such requirements to be expressed. It is
clear that the authority and capability to coordinate intelligence
requirements, establish relative priorities, and assign collection
and production tasks to the proper organizations, is the key to
efficient and effective management of the intelligence process.

b. Collection

The Military Departments own, manage and operate
almost all general Defense intelligence collection resources
except the Defense Attaches, who are assigned from the Services
and managed by DIA. The Departments have developed different
organizational structures for controlling intelligence collection;
however, they have two very important points in common: the senior
intelligence officer of the Departmental Headquarters has some
degree of operational control; and the intelligence units are
structured in a common chain separate from the operational command
structure.

The Army has established the U.S. Army Intelligence
Command (USAINTC) to discharge some of the Army's intelligence
responsibilities including all collection, other than that per-
formed by the Army Security Agency. While USAINTC is a major
command reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army,
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, maintains direct
operational control of some of its more sensitive elements.

The Navy has all of its general defense intelli-
gence resources in the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC). The
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) is also the
Commander, NIC.

The Air Force has retained the control of non-
technical sensor intelligence collection in the Departmental
Staff. A world-wide human collection effort is controlled by
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, while all the
resources for counterintelligence and investigations are assigned
to the Inspector General.

There is no effective mechanism for the allocation
of collection resources to assure that needed information is
collected in the most economical manner, consistent with the
urgency of the need.

TOP SECRET

The Defense Atomic Support Agency is the only
Defense Agency, other than DIA, with a stated intelligence
mission, with the responsibility for the counter-intelligence
and security mission associated with the physical security of
nuclear weapons.

(1) Personnel Security Investigations

25X1

Personnel security investigations are a

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

The regulations of each of the Military
Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous
investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government
which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that partic-
ular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments
interpret this narrowly and usually do not accept the investiga-
tions of another Department as meeting their standards.

c. Processing

Most raw intelligence information must be processed
in some way to put it in a form suitable for use by a production
analyst. Each type of information requires its own processing;
e.g., captured documents are translated or SIGINT is processed
by NSA.

The Director, Central Intelligence (DCI) provides
as a service of common interest within the community the National
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) (C). The Director,
NPIC (C), is appointed by the DCI and the member departments and
agencies of the United States Intelligence Board furnish personnel
and support as required. NPIC (C) provides selective preliminary
interpretation and distribution of imagery interpretation, main-
tains a selective central file of photo data, engages in and
sponsors the development of specialized equipment and makes
recommendations to USIB on any special security controls required.

d. Production

The intelligence production activities of the DOD
can be classified into four major groups: Current Intelligence;
Scientific and Technical Intelligence; Mapping, Charting and
Geodesy (MC&G), and general intelligence production.

The March 1962 memoranda from the JCS to DIA and
the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands mentioned
previously also directed that the Unified and Specified Commands
establish and/or operate activities, except for activities under
Service cryptologic agencies, to perform intelligence functions
of common interest. This was amplified and specified in July
1962 by JCS memorandum to establish a current intelligence/indica-
tions function; intelligence production including estimates func-
tion; and target intelligence function.

TOP SECRET

It should be noted at this point that the Military
Departments had not yet transferred to DIA their intelligence
production elements. That was done in January, February and
March 1963.

The assignment of intelligence production mission
to the Unified and Specified Commands directly contradicted the
function spelled out in the DOD Directive 5105.21 which estab-
lished DIA, that DIA would "develop, produce, and provide all
Defense finished intelligence and supporting data, including
area analysis, military capabilities, biographic data summaries,
target intelligence, and related publications for the use of all
DOD components...." The JCS further had charged DIA with ensuring
that there would be no duplication in the production of intelli-
gence.

By 1966, DIA acknowledged the realities of the
situation by issuing the Defense Intelligence Plan which had
been extensively coordinated with the Military Departments and
the Unified and Specified Commands. The purpose of the Plan
was to provide the basis for integrated planning, programming
and management of Defense intelligence. It delineated the
intelligence responsibilities and relationships of Department
of Defense components and instituted a Department-wide system
for review and analysis of intelligence operations to facilitate
mutual support and eliminate wasteful duplication. One of the
principles which this Plan spelled out was that "intelligence
produced at higher echelons must be supplemented by local pro-
duction at lower echelons in order to satisfy particular command
requirements." The Plan further acknowledged that "some degree
of parallel and overlapping effort is normal and necessary." The
primary role of DIA thus shifted from the production of all Defense
intelligence to the production of some strategic or that intelli-
gence used at the JCS/OSD/national level. The members of the
JCS, as chiefs of service, still maintain current intelligence
and estimates capabilities on their respective staffs to support
their positions vis-a-vis those of DIA.

It should be borne in mind that these actions
were the result of extensive negotiations with the Military
Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands including
component commands. DIA has no directive authority over military
intelligence activities, but only review, coordination, supervisory
and a nebulous management authority. But more and more, DIA has
been pushed into a management role by those very elements which
maintain that DIA is incapable of producing intelligence to meet
their needs.

Each of the Military Departments has continued to strengthen the capability of its staff to produce general and current intelligence and to supervise the production of S&T intelligence and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) activities.

Each Department has a large organization devoted primarily to MC&G activities: The Army Topographic Command of the Corps of Engineers; The Naval Oceanographic Office under the Oceanographer of the Navy; and The Aeronautical Chart and Information Center reporting to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

DIA attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Departmental staffs, and only in the Air Force is the MC&G agency within the staff purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G elements are in agencies which are not a part of the intelligence community.

There appears to be great potential for savings of personnel and expensive equipment by consolidating these three agencies into one Defense Map Service with a single command staff.

Each of the Military Departments produces S&T intelligence. The Army has two S&T production agencies; both subordinate to the Army Materiel Command: The Foreign Science and Technology Center reporting to the staff of the Army Materiel Command Headquarters; and the Missile Intelligence Directorate, an element of the Army Missile Command. The Air Force S&T intelligence production agency is the Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force Systems Command. The Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center is an element of the NIC.

Both the Army and Air Force agencies are an integral part of the research and development community and their efforts are substantially augmented from research and development funds.

DIA has tasking authority over each of the Centers and assigns the specific production tasks to be accomplished with a specified scope and format. The large majority of the requirements for S&T intelligence production arise in the research and

development laboratories of the Services. DIA reviews the individual requirements and generalizes them so that many requirements will be satisfied by one general product. The format and scope of the product is aimed primarily at the Departmental or major command staff planners. As a consequence, it appears that S&T intelligence products do not satisfy the requirements of the scientists in the research and development laboratories, have no relevance to the managers at OSD level, and are generally not used by Departmental and major command staff planners.

Threat assessments are a type of intelligence product that are based on S&T intelligence but are usually prepared by an agency other than an S&T intelligence producer. Any recommendation or decision to develop or produce a weapon or weapons system should include consideration of the enemy threat in the time period when the weapons or weapons systems will be operational. Such recommendations and decisions are made in the Services and OSD.

The general defense intelligence community has not yet succeeded in producing threat assessments which are accepted by the research and development community, largely because each Service tends to see the threat that will advance the weapons or systems it owns or proposes. There are, of course, many instances, such as the so-called "missile gap" of 1960, where an intelligence threat assessment has been used to bring about major weapons decisions.

DDR&E has established his own group to prepare threat assessments for use at the OSD level.

There is always a danger that intelligence will be misused when an organization prepares the intelligence assessments that provide a basis for its operating decisions.

e. Dissemination

The DIA, on a daily basis, disseminates reports to elements of the DOD intelligence community based on requests from the individual elements. Dissemination of a general nature is based on statements of intelligence needs compiled by the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands. Bulk copies are shipped to the Military Departments who further disseminate them to their subordinate elements and component commands of the Unified Commands. For those products not produced by DIA, dissemination lists are compiled by DIA and furnished to the producing organization for direct dissemination.

40

f. Evaluation

There is one other function which should be associated with the intelligence process: evaluation. Discussions with users and potential users of intelligence seem to indicate that only a small proportion of the intelligence produced is useful. Many individuals who are familiar with the Defense intelligence community are critical of its operation. Responsible witnesses have told our sub-committee that:

(1) The Defense intelligence community does not have an effective mechanism for accomplishing the selective validation of requirements for intelligence collection or production;

(2) More intelligence information is collected than can ever be processed or used, much of it is collected because the sensor represents an advance in technology without regard to the need for the information;

(3) The human collection activities of the Services add little or nothing to the national capability;

(4) Defense attaches do more harm than good;

(5) The intelligence production analysts are not competent to produce a sound, useful product; and

(6) Once produced, the product seldom reaches the individuals who need it.

None of these allegations can be either proved or disproved today, because there is no substantial effort or procedure to systematically evaluate the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community or its substantive output.

D. Special Programs

From time to time, special programs are established to manage the development of some new collection resource or capability. Such developments are usually expensive and involve some degree of cooperation with some other agency of Government. A program of this type is often designated as a "National Program" and the Secretary of Defense is designated Executive Agent for the Government. As a consequence, the responsibility for such a program tends to be placed at a relatively high level in the

41

TOP SECRET

Headquarters of one of the Military Departments. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has established a committee to review such programs and advise him with regard to the allocation of forces to them. Some program managers attempt to use the existence of this committee and the "National" designation of the program to avoid reporting to the ASD(A). Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the head of the cooperating agency sees any ambiguity in the reporting lines, but many manhours are wasted in debate and the task of the Secretary's senior representative is made more difficult. Another effect of this type of parochial tactic is that it establishes a fiction that permeates the entire staff of the program. In one particular program which was surveyed for the Panel, the Program staff was either ignorant of their responsibilities and relationships in the community or deliberately misleading in their statements.

A different type of problem also exists with programs of this sort. Since they are predominantly concerned with the development of a new capability, the management of the program is usually assigned to a development agency. This is necessary and proper for the development of the capability; however, it does not appear necessary that the output of the new capability also be managed by the development agency. Proper safeguards can be established to permit wider exploitation of the product on a more timely basis than at present.

E. Tactical Intelligence

All of the intelligence effort discussed to this point is called "strategic" or "national" intelligence. It is the intelligence needed for planning and making decisions at the top levels of the Department of Defense as distinguished from "tactical" intelligence which is needed by the field commander for use in combat. In large part, the resources required to collect and process the raw intelligence information are identical for both strategic and tactical intelligence. However, "tactical" intellience resources are not specifically identified as such in the programming process and are not reviewed or funded in an intelligence program.

The Military Departments, in fulfilling their responsibility to develop and support intelligence systems organic to combat forces, can develop a significant intelligence capability that is managed external to the intelligence community. For example, the Air Force 440L system was developed to provide early warning

TOP SECRET

of an impending attack against the United States, however, the sensor system has the capability to collect many other types of intelligence information, but the full capability is not exploited.

The DOD cannot afford to develop expensive resources exclusively for "strategic" or "tactical" intelligence purposes, nor to develop extensive duplicate resources for both. The development and operation of intelligence resources must be managed so that both types of requirements are satisfied at the minimum cost. The relative priorities of strategic and tactical needs tend to permit minimum costs with good management.

There is a continuum between peace and general war through which the priority needs for intelligence tend to shift from primarily strategic to primarily tactical. The same resources can be used to satisfy both needs by adjusting the application of resources to the changing priority.

In time of peace or cold war, the priority is for the most timely and accurate intelligence at the national (Washington) level to provide a basis for the best policy and guidance decisions. The field commander should want this to be the case to insure that policy decisions affecting the force structure he might have to fight with were the best. In this period of cold war, his principal intelligence need is continuity on strengths and positions of forces which might engage him if fighting erupts.

In time of limited warfare, a localized force commander must have the best intelligence to conduct his operations and the national level needs timely intelligence to formulate national policy, insure the fighting commander sufficient forces, and best deploy the remaining forces to meet other commitments.

In time of general war the priority is to provide the fighting force commander with the intelligence needed to prosecute the war; relatively less emphasis is placed on long-range policy decisions.

The intelligence resources integral to the combatant forces must be programmed, developed and operated as a part of the Defense Intelligence community. At the same time, it is necessary to manage and operate these resources in a way that assures that commanders at all levels have appropriate access to intelligence information they need without regard to the location or control of the sensors.

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Recommendations

The Panel recommends that the Defense intelligence community be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the President, other consumers at the national level and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defense to operating units in the field. The new intelligence structure should:

1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities.

2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flow of intelligence information and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location.

3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who is the clearly designated representative of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence activities within the Department.

4. Provide flexibility for timely development and distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained personnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities.

5. Provide the proper environment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service for both military and civilian personnel.

Specifically, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

* *

(1.) Designate the Deputy Secretary for Operations to be his agent for all matters relating to intelligence, to include the authority to designate those activities to be considered intelligence activities.

* *

46

2. Establish under the Deputy Secretary for Operations an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)) with the additional title of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). The ASD(I)/DDI would be delegated the responsibility to represent the Secretary of Defense with other Departments and Agencies of Government for Intelligence matters and to coordinate or direct all DOD intelligence activities, including national programs which are managed in the Department, in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Among his specific responsibilities, the ASD(I)/DDI would:

a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelligence Board, and appoint, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, representatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards.

b. Direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces.

c. Have the authority to delegate operation of any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximum exploitation of DOD resources.

d. Review all proposed intelligence programs, monitor and evaluate all on-going intelligence activities and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with regard to allocation of resources.

e. Establish procedures to review and validate requirements for intelligence production and collection and evaluate the product against the requirement.

f. Establish procedures for and periodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. This evaluation should include an assessment of the utility of the intelligence products provided to consumers outside the Defense intelligence community.

g. *Review and consolidate requirements for research and development in support of intelligence activities.*

h. *Develop policies and procedures to insure the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This will include the establishment and control of special access systems for sensitive programs not already covered by systems initiated by higher authority. He will insure that balanced judgment is applied between the need for exploitation and the need for protection, particularly recognizing that the balance of this relationship shifts through the phases of intelligence operations: identifying requirements and concept formulation; development, procurement and implementation; collection; processing; production; and dissemination.*

* *

* *

3. *Establish under the ASD(I)/DDI:*

a. *A Defense Security Command (DSECC) to be composed of the present Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except for those which have been specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. The DSECC should perform those processing activities which are most efficiently associated with collection facilities. Among his specific responsibilities, the Commander, DSECC would, under the direction of the DDI:*

(1) *Command all those designated Defense intelligence collection and associated processing and reporting activities, with authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.*

(2) *Serve as Director, National Security Agency.*

(3) Insure the most judicious use of common staff elements between his DSECC and NSA.

(4) Insure the timely dissemination of intelligence information to all appropriate Departments, Agencies, Commands or operating units.

(5) Prepare the Defense Security Program for those activities for which he is responsible, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence collection activities organic to the combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

b. A Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), to replace the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Director would be responsible for Defense Intelligence production except for those production activities specifically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary for Operations. Among his specific responsibilities, the Director, DIPA would:

(1) Direct those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Provide current intelligence to designated individuals and organizations.

(3) Provide threat assessments for all elements of DOD, as required.

(4) Provide finished intelligence to appropriate elements of the Department in response to expressed needs.

(5) Provide all DOD intelligence estimates and inputs to national estimates as directed by the DDI.

(6) Manage all Defense intelligence production information systems, including those of the intelligence activities organic to the combatant forces, to insure interoperability and optimized intelligence flow to and from all echelons of DOD.

TOP SECRET

(7) Prepare the Defense Intelligence Program for those activities under his direction, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence production activities organic to combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

* *

* *

4. Expand the responsibilities of the National Security Agency to include the processing, data base maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information as directed by the DDI.

* *

* *

5. Establish within the DSECC a unified Defense Investigative Service responsible for all personnel security investigations within the DOD and its contractors.

* *

TOP SECRET

6. Combine the Army Topographic Command, the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center into a unified Defense Map Service reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Management of Resources).

* *

* *

7. Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entire Defense intelligence community the authority that the National Security Agency presently has to develop a professional career service, and (b) to establish an intelligence career service for military officers.

* *